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Abstract
This paper studies different welfare-enhancing roles that fiat money can have. To do
so, we consider an indivisible monetary framework where agents are randomly and
bilaterally matched and the government has weak enforcement powers. Within this
environment, we analyze state contingent monetary policies and characterize the re-
sulting equilibria under different government record-keeping technologies. We show
that a threat of injecting fiat money, conditional on private actions, can improve
allocations and achieve efficiency. This type of state contingent policy is effective
even when the government cannot observe any private trades and agents can only
communicate with the government through cheap talk. In all these equilibria fiat
money and self-enforcing credit are complements in the off equilibrium. Finally,
this type of equilibria can also emerge even when the injection of fiat money is not
a public signal.
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“The master does nothing, yet he leaves nothing undone. The Tao never does
anything, yet through it all things are done.”
Tao Te Ching by Laozi
1 Introduction
In Friedman’s (1969) influential paper, the notion of the optimum quantity of money has
become one of the most widely debated propositions in monetary economics. Since then
the optimality and efficiency of the Friedman rule has been shown to be robust across dif-
ferent monetary environments.1 In particular, in environments with divisible fiat money
and some decentralized trades, efficiency can be achieved if the monetary authority can
generate deflation and the trading protocol in anonymous markets is monotone in the
buyer’s surplus.2 First best allocations can also be obtained without taxation, when
agents are sufficiently patient and the equilibrium has the coalition-proof implementabil-
ity property.3 Thus, unless the previous conditions are satisfied, pure monetary equilibria
is then inefficient.
By exploiting the fact that pure monetary equilibria can be inefficient when agents
are not sufficiently patient and taxation is not feasible, we highlight different welfare-
enhancing roles that fiat money can have on and off the equilibrium path. To do so, we
consider the indivisible monetary framework of Kiyotaki and Wright (1993). Agents are
randomly and bilaterally matched and discount the future. The discount rate is not high
enough so that Araujo’s (2004) gift-giving (no self-enforcing credit) equilibrium cannot
be supported. There is also a government that issues indivisible fiat money, however, it
1We refer the reader to Woodford (1990), Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1996) and Williamson and
Wright (2010a,b) for more on this topic.
2Aruoba, Rocheteau and Waller (2007) show how efficiency, in the Lagos and Wright (2005) frame-
work, can be attained under the Friedman rule if the trading protocol is monotone in the buyer’s surplus.
When the surplus is not monotone, Gomis-Porqueras et al (2010) show the need of fiscal policy to obtain
the efficient allocation. We refer to Nosal and Rocheteau (2010) for an excellent exposition of these
results.
3Hu, Kennan and Wallace (2009) show that one can obtain the first best without Friedman rule in
the Lagos and Wright (2005) when the equilibrium is coalition-proof implementable and when agents are
sufficiently patient. When policies are incentive compatible, Andolfatto (2010) shows that a government
that pays interest on money holdings and can record the identity of agents that receive such payment
delivers efficient allocations.
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can not collect taxes, making all trades voluntary. Finally, following Kandori (1992), we
assume that private agents cannot observe the trade history of other agents. Within this
environment, we characterize the equilibrium consistent with state contingent monetary
policies under different government record-keeping technologies.4
The search-theoretic approach to monetary economics argues that the important role
of fiat money is its role as a medium of exchange as it increases welfare (Kiyotaki and
Wright (1991,1993)). The rationale is that fiat money, when functions as a medium
of exchange, can (partially) resolve the double coincidence of wants problem and hence
enhance welfare. Under various information structures, this paper demonstrates that it is
not essential for fiat money to function as a medium of exchange on the equilibrium path
for it to play a welfare-enhancing role in society. Specifically, we show that contingent
monetary policies that threaten to inject fiat money based on different information sets
available to the government can help sustain efficient allocations. Under perfect and
partial record-keeping, gift-exchange can be sustained as a sequential equilibrium, when
fiat money is injected whenever the government detects a deviation from gift-giving.
When the government can not observe any private trade but agents can send costless and
non-verifiable signals to the government at the end of each bilateral meeting (cheap talk),
a slightly more elaborate contingent money injection policy, based on the received cheap
talk from agents, is required to achieve efficient allocations. Since reporting a deviation
triggers a monetary injection, proper incentives have to be given to agents, ensuring that
truth-telling is optimal. This requires that when there is no deviation, an agent should
not report it to the government. This is the case as moving to the monetary equilibrium
makes the reporting agent worse off. Moreover, the policy has to provide incentives
such that when an agent sees a deviation, this agent should immediately report to the
government. For that to be the case, reporting has to be rewarded. Such contingent
monetary policy delivers an equilibrium where self-enforcing credit can be sustained as
an equilibrium outcome. We also show that the limiting discount rate consistent with the
4Note that the equilibrium where the government injects fiat money after it observes a deviation from
gift-giving can be thought as a harsh bankruptcy law, whereby agents that default on their promises are
excluded from the credit market and can only have access to their own savings.
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gift-giving equilibrium is independent of the population size. In all the previous monetary
equilibria, fiat money enhances welfare not because of its medium of exchange functions,
but because it plays a role as a signal for agents to coordinate their equilibrium behavior.
In our environment fiat money is a medium of exchange in the off equilibrium and a
punishment, but it never circulates in equilibrium.5 Thus, fiat money and self-enforcing
credit are complements in the off equilibrium.6 We also argue that for our contingent
monetary policy to work, it is not important whether money injection is a public signal
or not.
2 Environment
Our environment is based on Kiyotaki and Wright (1993). Time is discrete and indexed
by t ≥ 1. The economy has a large number of indivisible consumption goods of unit size.
N > 3 infinitely lived agents discount the future at a rate β ∈ (0, 1), where β < βSN
so that supporting a gift-giving social norm is not feasible.7 Agents derive utility u > 0
from a fraction x ∈ (0, 1) of these goods.8 However, which goods they receive a payoff
from is agent specific. In each period, agents are bilaterally matched under a uniform
random matching technology. Let mt(i) be agent i
′s trading partner in period t. Double-
coincidence of wants meetings occur with probability δ = x2, while single-coincidence
meetings happen with probability σ = x(1 − x). Agents have access to a technology
whereby an agent can not produce the good that she wants to consume. When producing
one unit of a commodity, drawn randomly from the set of all commodities, agents incur
a cost c > 0, where u > c.
Agents cannot observe the past actions of their trading partners, as in Kandori (1992).
Once bilateral matches {(i,mt(i))} are formed, i and mt(i) play a stage game. In the
5As Gu et al (2016) point out, when the distribution of fiat money is degenerate, it is challenging to
have self-enforcing credit and fiat money coexist.
6We refer the reader to Gomis-Porqueras and Sanches (2013), Araujo and Hu (2018), Lotz and Zhang
(2016), among others, for instances where fiat money and credit are complements on the equilibrium
path.
7βSN denotes the lowest discount rate for a social norm to sustain gift-giving. We refer the reader to
Araujo (2004) for more on the derivation of this threshold discount rate and the gift-giving equilibrium.
8N is assumed to be even for simplicity.
4
stage game, agent i chooses whether to produce for agent mt(i), and vice versa. From
now on, let Uit(ait, amt(i)t) be i
′s stage payoff, where ait ∈ Ai is i′s action in period t.
Then i′s total payoff in the repeated matching game, where the payoff is the expected
sum of his stage payoffs discounted by β. Let at−1i denote i
′s record of play up to period
t− 1.
Finally, there is a government that can issue indivisible fiat money, and agents can
only hold at most one unit per period.9 Moreover, the government has no enforcement
power so that taxation is not feasible, making all trades voluntary. Lastly, we allow
the government to have different information sets by having access to different record-
keeping technologies.10 In particular, we consider the following scenarios: (i) perfect
observability and record-keeping of all private trades, as in Kocherlakota (1998), (ii)
partial observability and record-keeping of private trades, as in Takahashi (2010) and
Araujo and Camargo (2015), and (iii) inability to observe any private trades, but agents
can communicate with the government through cheap talk.11
2.1 Government Policies
In the original Kiyotaki and Wright (1993), the government simply injects fiat money in
the initial period and does not subsequently change the economy’s money supply. We
denote such operating procedure for monetary policy as Policy I. An alternative is a state
contingent monetary policy where there is an injection of fiat money conditional on an
agent deviating from gift-giving. We denote such procedure as Policy II. When money
injection is a public signal, it is important to highlight that regardless of the policy stance
(Policy I or Policy II), there always exist a monetary and a non-monetary equilibrium.
In this later one, agents revert to autarky after they observe money injection.12
From now on, we study monetary equilibrium after fiat money is injected. We do so for
9We are implicitly assuming that the government can commit to future actions.
10This is in contrast to Kiyotaki and Wright (1989, 1991, 1993), Araujo (2004), Araujo and Camargo
(2015) and Wiseman (2015), among others, where the government does not have access to any record-
keeping service.
11The case where the government has an inability to observe private trades is related to that of Awaya
and Fukai (2015).
12For more on this type of equilibria, we refer the reader to Kocherlakota (1998).
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the following reasons. First, whenever fiat money is injected, the monetary equilibrium
delivers a higher expected payoff, when compared to the non-monetary equilibrium. Thus,
using payoff dominance as an equilibrium refinement, the monetary equilibrium would be
the predicted outcome of the subgame following money injection.13 Second, by focusing
on monetary equilibria, we can have a better understanding of the various roles fiat money
can have under different government information sets and how it relates to self-enforcing
credit.
Through out the rest of the paper, we explore how a government can induce coop-
eration among private agents by threatening to inject fiat money after a deviation from
gift-giving has been observed.14 This type of policy can be seen as a punishment, as inject-
ing fiat money results in lower social welfare relative to gift-giving equilibria. Whenever
such policy works, it is better than Policy I, as gift-giving Pareto dominates the monetary
equilibrium. The key question that this paper addresses is how much information the
government needs in order to implement such state contingent policy. We show that the
information requirement is much weaker than one a priori would expect.
3 Monetary Equilibrium
In this section we analyze the resulting monetary equilibrium of a government that follows
a policy of injecting fiat money after private agents have deviated from gift-giving. More
precisely, monetary policy is a one-off injection of fiat money contingent on the history
of action profiles in stage games {(ais, ams(i)s)}s=1,..,t−1 for i ∈ N. Therefore, such policy
can be viewed as a machine or automaton that determines the timing and the amount
of the (one-off) injection of fiat money contingent on history. Such injection is a public
signal. We examine this type of policy under various government informations sets and
record-keeping technologies.
13For more on this refinement, we refer the reader to Harsanyi and Selten (1988).
14We are implicitly assuming that the government can commit to future actions.
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3.1 Perfect Observability
We first consider a situation where the government can perfectly observe and record all
trades by private agents. Suppose the government’s monetary policy is such that M<N
units of money are randomly distributed among agents at the beginning of period t, if
there exists a bilateral match {(i,mt−1(i))} in period t− 1 where i likes mt−1(i)′s good,
but mt−1(i) does not produce the good to i. Given this monetary policy, consider the
following profile of strategies for agents:
SWoM (Without Money): Whenever an agent meets someone who likes his
good, he produces the good for her (unconditional gift-giving).
SWM (With Money): Once M units of money are injected, agents follow
the strategies prescribed in the monetary equilibrium of Kiyotaki and Wright
(1993), where agents only produce if their counter-party exchanges fiat money
for goods.
Proposition 1. Under a state contingent policy of threatening to inject fiat money
whenever a deviator is observed, SWoM and SWM constitute a sequential equilibrium if
β ≥ βPO, where βPO ≡ c
c+σmin{1−M(N−M)
N(N−1) ,
N−M
N−1 }(u−c)
< 1.
All proofs can be found in the Appendix.
As we can see, Proposition 1 highlights that if the government is able to actively and
perfectly monitor market activities and take contingent actions, fiat money can be used
as an effective threat to induce cooperation. We also note that the policy considered is
not individual-specific, as money is injected randomly among agents after a deviation is
observed. Hence punishment is not targeted to any specific individual. To implement
this policy, knowing the identity of the deviator is not necessary. Finally, note that fiat
money and self-enforcing credit are complements.
3.2 Partial Observability
We now relax the information and records that the government can have at its disposal.
Following Araujo and Camargo (2015), we assume that the record-keeping technology is
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only able to store information of all last-period bilateral trades. In this new environment,
the government randomly injects M units of money in period t if there exists a bilateral
match (i,mt−1(i)) in period t − 1 where i likes mt−1(i)′s good, but mt−1(i) does not
produce the good to i. We note that in order to implement this government policy, one
does not need to recover the whole history of past trades. It only requires that the
action taken by agents in the last period is observed. This requirement is consistent
with the conditions outlined in Proposition 1. Thus, as long as β ≥ βPO, a policy of
threatening to injecting fiat money can support gift-giving when the government has
partial observability. As in the previous environment, fiat money acts as a public signal,
as a medium of exchange in the off equilibrium and as a punishment. Moreover, fiat
money and self-enforcing credit are complements in the off equilibrium.
3.3 Cheap Talk
The literature has shown that fiat money can enhance welfare when used as a medium of
exchange, as it functions as a form of record-keeping or memory to (practically) resolve
the double coincidence of wants problem.15 This type of equilibria, however, does not
exploit all of the information that each agent has. As Hayek (1945) highlighted: “...
and the problem of what is the best way of utilizing knowledge initially dispersed among
all the people is at least one of the main problems of economic policy or of designing an
efficient economic system”. Here we exploit the fact that private trading generates some
information. We then explore how it can be used by the monetary authority to induce
better allocations, even when the government cannot observe any private trades.
In this limited information setting, the only way to obtain information is for agents
to inform the government about her trading partner’s behavior. We assume that the
communication between the government and agents is cheap talk as we have that: (i)
sending a message is costless, (ii) the message is non-binding and (iii) the correctness
15The literature on the essentially of fiat money mainly focuses on the substitutability between memory
and money. For instance, in Kocherlakota (1998), memory is defined as knowledge on the part of an
agent of the full histories of all agents with whom he has had direct or indirect contact in the past.
Kocherlakota shows that any allocation that is feasible in an environment with money is also feasible in
the same environment with memory. Hence he concludes that money is equivalent to a primitive form
of memory.
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of the message cannot be verified; i.e., there is no hard evidence to verify whether an
agent tells the truth or not. After receiving messages from agents, the government can
implement monetary policy. In particular, the monetary authority decides whether or
not to inject fiat money conditional on whether an agent(s) reports to the government or
not.
In this new environment, the timing of the game with cheap talk is as follows. There
are three stages in each period. In the first stage, agents are matched and they decide
whether to produce or not. In the second stage, each agent has the option to report to
the government if her trading partner does not produce for her. In the third stage, after
receiving the messages from agents (if any), the government decides whether to inject fiat
money or not.
Within this environment, we ask whether it is possible to design a policy to sup-
port gift-giving in this cheap talk game. Since the government is not able to observe
any economic activity, it relies on agents to truthfully report the actions of her trading
partners. Hence for a money injection threat policy to work, proper incentives must be
provided such that: (i) when seeing a deviation, an agent has an incentive to report
to the government and (ii) when there is no deviation, an agent has no incentive to lie
that someone has deviated. Note that in this environment it is sufficient to consider the
following simple binary message space: report or not report.
Suppose the government’s monetary policy is such that if no one reports, no fiat money
is injected. If there is only one reporter, the central bank hands out one unit of money
to the reporter. If there are two or more reporters, 2 units of money will be randomly
distributed among reporters. Given this monetary policy, consider agents’ production
and reporting strategies as follows:
SA: Suppose there is no fiat money in the economy. Irrespective of their
previous private history, agents exchange goods simultaneously in double-
coincidence of wants meetings. When an agent meets another in a single-
coincidence meeting where the later likes his good, he gives the good to that
agent. If in a meeting an agent fails to give a good that the other agent likes,
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both agents report to the government in that round. Otherwise, there is trade
and no one reports to the government. However, when the government injects
fiat money, agents simply follow the strategies prescribed in the monetary
equilibrium of Kiyotaki and Wright (1993), where agents only produce if their
counter-party exchanges fiat money for goods.
Proposition 2. Under the government’s contingent money injection policy, SA consti-
tutes a sequential equilibrium if β ≥ βCT , where βCT < 1 and limN→∞ βCT < 1.
We refer the reader to the appendix for βCT ’s explicit expression.
As we can see, money and (minimal) information resulting from private trades can
complement each other and achieve the first best. Without money, the economy reverts to
autarky. On the other hand, injecting money without utilizing the knowledge possessed by
each agent, the outcome is not efficient. Three additional remarks are noteworthy. First,
Proposition 2 establishes that even when the government can not observe private trades,
as long as agents are able to communicate the underlying economic activities through
cheap talk, gift-giving can be sustained under a money injection threat policy. As in the
previous scenarios, in equilibrium money never circulates, yet the first best outcome is
achieved. Second, the government will inject no more than two units of money. When
an agent deviates from gift-giving, only two agents are aware of the deviation. Injecting
one unit of money to induce truth-reporting from the agent who sees the deviation is
not incentive compatible. This is the case as she finds it optimal to not report to the
government as the expected payoff following the monetary equilibrium is lower than what
she can get by not reporting. This is the case as others still follow unconditional gift-
giving towards her. On the other hand, injecting two units of fiat money ensures that both
agents, in the match where deviation is observed, will report to the government. This is
the case as each agent knows that the other agent is going to report to the government,
so it is optimal for her to report to the government as well. Then both agents will get a
higher expected payoff in the subsequent monetary equilibrium.16 Finally, Proposition 2
16Like any coordination game, in the game with cheap talk there are other possible equilibria. In
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highlights that without government intervention, given a discount factor β, a social norm
to support gift-giving constructed in Araujo (2004) (without government intervention)
eventually breaks down when the population size is large as limN→∞ βSN = 1. Instead
with our state contingent monetary policy, gift-giving can be sustained in economies with
any arbitrarily large population size provided that β ≥ limN→∞ βCT .
Private Signal
We now consider a situation where money injection is not a public signal. As a result, pri-
vate agents do not immediately know when a deviation from gift-giving has taken place.
Nevertheless, fiat money still conveys information when agents trade with each other.
This is the case as agents can not hide fiat money from each other. As a result, agents
learn about a deviation through contagion as in Kandori (1992). For finite populations,
all agents in the economy eventually learn that a deviation has taken place. Thus, in
a stationary equilibrium and in the off equilibrium path all agents play a Kiyotaki and
Wright (1993) monetary equilibrium with M=2. Moreover, we could design a contingent
monetary policy that distributes M > 2 units of money to the society when two agents
report to the government. In this way, we can speed up the contagious process towards
the Kiyotaki and Wright monetary equilibrium, which further weakens agents’ incentives
to deviate from equilibrium. Depending on the choice of M, fiat money under our con-
struction serves as a signal for agents to coordinate their equilibrium behavior – it is a
purely private signal when M = 2 to a public signal when M = N.
4 Conclusions
Typically, pure monetary equilibrium, without active government intervention, does not
achieve first-best allocations. In this paper, we exploit the monetary inefficiency property
when thinking about monetary policy in the Kiyotaki and Wright (1993) environment
with a government that has weak enforcement powers and agents are not too patient. In
particular, there is always an equilibrium with autarky regardless of what has happened before, agents
never produce. Since this equilibrium is pay off dominated by the monetary one, we focus on this latter
one.
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particular, we consider an active monetary policy whereby the government threatens to
inject fiat money if a deviation from gift-giving is observed. We show that in equilibrium
fiat money is never injected and first best allocations are obtained even when the gov-
ernment does not have access to any private records and agents can only communicate
with the government through cheap talk. Moreover, we show that gift-giving can be
sustained in a large society with any population size provided that agents are sufficiently
patient. Finally, all the equilibria analyzed in this paper are such that fiat money and
self-enforcing credit (gift-giving) are complements on the off equilibrium path. Moreover,
even when money injection is not a public signal, agents can learn about a deviation
through contagion as in Kandori (1992), making our state contingent monetary policy
useful.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
First we observe that on the equilibrium path (where agents follow unconditional gift-
giving), the expected payoff for each agent is
VG =
σ + δ
1− β (u− c).
Once the government sees a deviation, M units of money are randomly injected into
the economy. Let V 0M denote the expected payoff of an agent without money and V
1
M the
expected payoff of an agent with money. Following Kiyotaki and Wright (1993), we have
V 0M = βV
0
M + σ
M
N − 1[−c+ β(V
1
M − V 0M)] + δ(u− c)
=
σ M
N−1 [−c+ β(V 1M − V 0M)] + δ(u− c)
1− β , and
V 1M = βV
1
M + σ
N −M
N − 1 [u+ β(V
0
M − V 1M)] + δ(u− c)
=
σN−M
N−1 [u+ β(V
0
M − V 1M)] + δ(u− c)
1− β .
The expected payoff for an agent who deviates is given by
Vd =
M
N
V 1M +
N −M
N
V 0M
=
M
N
σN−M
N−1 [u+ β(V
0
M − V 1M)] + δ(u− c)
1− β +
N −M
N
σ M
N−1 [−c+ β(V 1M − V 0M)] + δ(u− c)
1− β
=
σM(N−M)
N(N−1) + δ
1− β (u− c).
Hence no agent will deviate from gift-giving if −c + βVG ≥ βVd, which implies that
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the discount rate has to satisfy
β ≥ c
c+ σ(1− M(N−M)
N(N−1) )(u− c)
.
On the other hand, after a deviation, in order for agents to follow a monetary equilib-
rium, we require β ≥ βM ≡ cc+σN−M
N−1 (u−c)
as derived in Kiyotaki and Wright (1993). The
two inequalities hold simultaneously if
β ≥ c
c+ σmin{1− M(N−M)
N(N−1) ,
N−M
N−1 }(u− c)
= βPO.
Proof of Proposition 2.
In order to show that the strategy profile supports gift exchange as an equilibrium, we
need to establish the following two conditions:
I. No agent has an incentive to deviate on the equilibrium path
There are two conditions to be established:
(i) As agents follow unconditional gift-giving on the equilibrium path, the expected payoff
for each agent is
VG =
σ + δ
1− β (u− c).
Pick any matched pair (i,mt(i)) in period t, and suppose (without loss of generality)
that mt(i) likes i
′s good. If agent i follows the equilibrium path and produces for mt(i),
his expected payoff is
−c+ βVG.
If i deviates from the equilibrium path and does not produce for mt(i), both i and
mt(i) will report to the central bank. The central bank then hands out one unit of money
to both i and mt(i). Following the monetary equilibrium after deviation, i
′s expected
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payoff is V 1M=2. Accordingly, i has no incentive to deviate whenever we satisfy
−c+ βVG ≥ βV 1M=2.
First we derive V 1M=2 explicitly. Again, following Kiyotaki and Wright (1993), V
0
M=2
and V 1M=2 satisfy the following system of equations: 1− β + 2σβN−1 −σ 2N−1β
−σβN−2
N−1 1− β + σβN−2N−1

 V 0M=2
V 1M=2
 =
 δ(u− c)− σ 2N−1c
δ(u− c) + σN−2
N−1u

Accordingly, V 1M=2 can be solved as
VM,2 =
(1− β + 2σβ
N−1)(δ(u− c) + σN−2N−1u) + σβN−2N−1(δ(u− c)− σ 2N−1c)
(1− β + 2σβ
N−1)(1− β + σβN−2N−1)− σ2β2 2(N−2)(N−1)2
=
(u− c)[δ(1− β + σβ N
N−1) +
2σ2β(N−2)
(N−1)2 ] + (1− β)σuN−2N−1
(1− β)(1− β + σβ N
N−1)
.
Hence the no-deviation condition becomes
−c+ β σ
1− β (u− c) ≥
β
1− β
(u− c)2σ2β(N−2)
(N−1)2 + (1− β)σuN−2N−1
1− β + σβ N
N−1
,
which can be rearranged as:
(u− c)βσ − (1− β)c
βσ
− N − 2
N − 1
(u− c) 2σβ
N−1 + (1− β)u
1− β + σβ N
N−1
≥ 0.
This inequality holds if
(u− c)βσ − (1− β)c
βσ
− (u− c)
2σβ
N−1 + (1− β)u
1− β + σβ ≥ 0.
After some simplifications, we get the following quadratic inequality in β :
[
c(2σ − 1) + σ2(u− c)(1− 2
N − 1)
]
β2 + 2c(1− σ)β − c ≥ 0.
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Let σ∗ denote the unique σ ∈ (0, 1) such that c(2σ− 1) +σ2(u− c)(1− 2
N−1) = 0. The
coefficient of β2
c(2σ − 1) + σ2(u− c)(1− 2
N − 1)

> 0 σ > σ∗
= 0 σ = σ∗
< 0 σ < σ∗
.
Consider N > 3 and let β∗1 denote the smallest value of β ∈ (0, 1) that satisfies the
above quadratic inequality. It can be readily verified that
β∗1 =

−2c(1−σ)+
√
(2c(1−σ))2+4c[c(2σ−1)+σ2(u−c)(1− 2N−1 )]
2[c(2σ−1)+σ2(u−c)(1− 2N−1 )]
σ 6= σ∗
1
2(1−σ) σ = σ
∗
.
(ii) When seeing no deviations, an agent has no incentive to unilaterally deviate from
the equilibrium path and report to the central bank. This requires
V 1M=1 ≤ VG.
Recall that
−c+ βV 1M=1 ≥ βV 0M=1, and V 1M=1 =
σN−1
N−1 [u+ β(V
0
M=1 − V 1M=1)] + δ(u− c)
1− β .
Therefore the above inequality holds as
V 1M=1 =
σN−1
N−1 [u+ β(V
0
M=1 − V 1M=1)] + δ(u− c)
1− β ≤
σ + δ
1− β (u− c) = VG.
II. No agent has an incentive to deviate off the equilibrium path
There are two conditions to be established:
(i) Since the government can not observe the actions of private agents, it is important to
determine whether agents have been provided proper incentives to report a deviation. To
determine when that will be the case, we need to establish, for any given matched pair,
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it is optimal for both agents to report to the central bank after seeing a deviation. We
note that after seeing a deviation from his trading partner, an agent must believe that his
trading partner is the only one who deviates. The following condition makes sure that
each agent in a matched pair will report to the central bank after seeing a deviation:
V 1M=2 ≥ V 0M=1.
When there is only one unit of money in the economy, we have the following system
of equations on V 0M=1 and V
1
M=1: 1− β + σβN−1 −σ 1N−1β
−σβ 1− β + σβ

 V 0M=1
V 1M=1
 =
 δ(u− c)− σ 1N−1c
δ(u− c) + σu

Hence V 0M=1 can be solved as
V 0M=1 =
(δ(u− c)− σ 1
N−1c)(1− β + σβ) + (δ(u− c) + σu)σ 1N−1β
(1− β + σβ
N−1)(1− β + σβ)− σ
2β2
N−1
.
The no-deviation inequality becomes
(u− c)[δ(1− β + σβ N
N−1) +
2σ2β(N−2)
(N−1)2 ] + (1− β)σuN−2N−1
(1− β)(1− β + σβ N
N−1)
≥ (δ(u− c)− σ
1
N−1c)(1− β + σβ) + (δ(u− c) + σu)σ 1N−1β
(1− β + σβ
N−1)(1− β + σβ)− σ
2β2
N−1
As (1− β)(1− β + σβ N
N−1) = (1− β + σβN−1)(1− β + σβ)− σ
2β2
N−1 , the inequality holds
if and only if
(u− c)[δ(1− β + σβ N
N − 1) +
2σ2β(N − 2)
(N − 1)2 ] + (1− β)σu
N − 2
N − 1
≥ (δ(u− c)− σ 1
N − 1c)(1− β + σβ) + (δ(u− c) + σu)σ
1
N − 1β.
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After some simplifications, we get
β ≤ u(N − 2) + c
u(N − 2) + c+ σ(u− c)( 2
N−1 − 1)
≡ β∗2 .
Observe that β∗2 > 1 when N > 3. Hence this condition holds for all β ∈ (0, 1)
whenever N > 3.
(ii) If someone deviates in a bilateral meeting, both agents will report to the central
bank, and two units of money will be injected into the economy. We need to make sure
that agents follow a monetary equilibrium after money injection, which requires
β ≥ βM=2 = c
c+ σN−2
N−1(u− c)
.
Now, combining all conditions in I and II, we conclude that there exists an equilibrium
where a threat of money injection can support gift-giving when N > 3 and
β ≥ βCT ≡ max{β∗1 , βM=2}.
Note that limN→∞ β∗1 < 1 and limN→∞ βM=2 < 1 thus we have that limN→∞ βCT < 1.
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